This paper aims at estimating the effect of different types of institutions on economic development. To tackle the endogeneity problem that is prevalent, an identification strategy exploiting the heteroskedasticity in the data is used. This also allows to analyze the reverse effect, running from economic development to institutions. In a sample of about 100 countries, an impact of property rights institutions but not contracting institutions on economic development is detected. Furthermore, the results suggest that a higher level of economic development improves contracting institutions, but not property rights institutions.
INTRODUCTION
A broad consensus prevails among economists that the institutional setting securing property rights is beneficial for economic development. The relative importance of different types of institutions has been studied recently by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , suggesting that property rights institutions but not contracting institutions are outweighs effects emanating from trade openness or geographic location. Regressing the mean annual rate of growth of output on, inter alia, a political freedom index and the mean growth of exports as a proportion of output (as a measure of the degree of trade openness), Mbaku and Kimenyi (1997) find similar results for output growth: There is a positive and significant effect of institutions on economic growth. Trade openness, in contrast, does not seem to have a significant impact. Finally, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) investigate the relative importance of different types of institutions and suggest that, at least for former colonies, property rights institutions but not contracting institutions are pivotal for economic development. Contracting institutions seem to matter only for the form of financial intermediation.
The IH method has several advantages. Firstly, one appropriate split of the data suffices for identification. In contrast, to apply an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, the researcher needs a suitable instrument for each endogenous variable. Secondly, a measure for the quality of the identification is obtained, indicating the reliability of the results. Thirdly, it is possible to estimate all coefficients of a simultaneous equations model. As the identification by the IH method is based on arguments exploiting country differences that are stable over time (see Section 2.1 and 4), this investigation relies on the cross-section variation between countries. Further, some variables used (e.g., legal formalism) are not available as time-series. Also, as institutions only change slowly over time, it is reasonable to exploit the cross-section variation.
Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , this paper differentiates between a horizontal and a vertical view on institutions. Contracting institutions point to the (horizontal) protection of property among individuals, e.g., the right of a creditor to prosecute a claim, whereas property rights institutions suggest a vertical dimension protecting the individual from expropriation by the ruling elite.
3 Thus, both types of institutions aim at the protection of property of individuals, but once vis-à-vis another individual and once vis-à-vis the state and the ruling elite. Economic development is measured by four different variables, GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, credit provided to the private sector, and stock market development.
The results suggest that, in line with the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) on former colonies, property rights institutions are relatively more important than contracting institutions for economic development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) offer a possible explanation. The relative importance of property rights institutions over contracting institutions for economic development may be due to the fact that the possibilities for an individual to cope with poor property rights institutions are far more limited than to contend with poor contracting institutions. In credit markets for example, a lender has several possibilities, as to increase the interest rate or to write long-term contracts which are based on reputation, to circumvent adverse contracting institutions. However, these remedies do not exist for the case of poor property rights institutions. It is almost impossible for an investor to protect himself from expropriation by the ruling elite.
Concerning the reverse effect running from institutions to economic development, a fairly robust and significant positive effect of economic development on contracting but not property rights institutions is detected. Thus, the results suggest that better property rights institutions have a potential to advance economic development. This in turn may create an appropriate environment for better contracting institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the identification strategy, Section 3 shows the data and the model. The following Section 4 discusses two splits of the data that ensure identification of the model. Section 5 presents the results and robustness checks and Section 6 finally concludes.
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
This section introduces the identification strategy that relies on the heteroskedasticity in the data (it follows closely Rigobon, 2003) . To see how the IH method works, consider the following simple example of a simultaneous equations model with two endogenous variables , that is the data will be demeaned such that no constant has to be included in the estimation. The problem is that the simultaneous equations model is not identified and cannot be estimated by OLS. The four unknown coefficients 12  , 21  , , wherefore identification is not possible. In order to solve the identification problem, further information is necessary. The idea is to use the potential heteroskedasticity of the structural residuals to achieve identification. The split of the sample in 2 ) 2 , 1 (  s or even more subsamples, which need to satisfy the following properties 
allows to increase the number of moment conditions: Assumption (1) states that the parameters have to be stable across the two subsamples. This is an assumption often made in cross-country regressions and does not impose a major restriction on the estimation. In the application, this assumption will be relaxed by allowing the constants to differ across the subsamples. Assumption (2) guarantees that the structural residuals are not correlated. The intuition behind the identification strategy and why property (3) is needed can be explained by using a simple example of demand and supply (see Rigobon, 2003) . Suppose there is data of the sales of a good dependent on the price that describes the demand and supply curves. An estimation of the slope of the demand curve by OLS is not possible, as the supply and the demand curve cannot be distinguished from each other. But given the data can be split in two subsamples such that the shock to the supply curve is more volatile in one of the subsamples than in the other, and the shock to the demand curve does not change across the subsamples, the system of equations will be identified. The reason is that the realizations, comparing the two subsamples, expands along the demand schedule if the variance of the supply shock increases. Notice however, that it is not an increase in the variance of the supply shock that is needed, but a change in the relative variance of the residuals. Thus, also the variance of the demand shock can change, but if both variances shift exactly by the same amount, identification is not possible. This is stated by assumption (3), which is equivalent to the rank condition for identification (see Appendix D for the derivation).
The IH method has three advantages: Firstly, a simultaneous equations model is identified by splitting the sample in two subsamples, wherefore no instruments for each endogenous variable are needed, like in the case of an IV estimation. Secondly, assumptions underlying the identification of the structural parameters can be, at least partially, tested. To see if property (1) holds, the constant terms for each subsample will be computed after estimating the parameters. These constants will then be compared. 4 If the hypothesis that the constants are identical cannot be rejected, there will be a justification for the assumption that the structural coefficients are stable across the split. Property (3) can also be tested by means of a t-test. Thus, it can be seen directly how well the identification works. Thirdly, the IH method allows to estimate the entire system of equations. That in turn allows to explore the reverse causality. One drawback of the method is that assumption (2) has to be maintained without the possibility of checking its reliability with a post-estimation test. However, by including control variables (as will be done later) the risk that the results are biased by common shocks across countries that affect both economic development and institutions can be alleviated. Further, in our view, the more serious problem is that of endogeneity of the variables. Indeed, in an OLS estimation, both of these problems (the endogeneity and the assumption, that the structural residuals are not correlated) are present. With the IH method, at least one of them is taken into account.
The bivariate case without exogenous variables can be extended to the multivariate case with several endogenous and exogenous variables and the system will still be just identified. The system of equations is estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM). Since in this application the problem is just identified, an identity matrix is used as weighting matrix. The variances of the parameters are computed by bootstrapping with draws out of the stored residuals. In all applications 500 draws are used. 5 3. DATA AND MODEL As in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , the two dimensions of institutions are measured by legal formalism and constraints on executive indices. Constraints on executive (CONSTRAINTS), the measure for property rights institutions, reflects the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process, capturing institutionalized constraints on the decision making power of chief executives. The values of the index range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating more constraints (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) . Legal formalism (FORMALISM), the measure for contracting institutions, captures the legal hazard involved in collecting a bounced check before local courts. Djankov et al. (2003) , relying on work by Shapiro (1981) , note that the current resolution mechanisms in courts depart, with respect to the degree of formalism, heavily from an idealized resolution mechanism with a disinterested third party judging the case without being bound to any law or procedure. They construct a formalism index mapping various deviations from the ideal resolution mechanism to a measure ranging from 0 to 7, with higher values indicating higher formalism. The index increases, for example, with higher qualification requirements for lawyers and judges, with the necessity of written rather than oral presentation and with legal justification of the case and the decision of the judge. Higher formalism makes a claim more costly and potentially less predictable (compared to the idealized resolution mechanism) for both parties involved. This in turn may have negative consequences on investment and, at the end, on economic development. The variables measuring economic development are GDPPC, real GDP per capita (based on purchasing power parity), INVEST, the investment to GDP ratio, CREDIT, an activity indicator in order to measure private credit allocated by deposit money banks and other financial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP and STOCK, a size indicator measuring stock market capitalization divided by GDP. The latter two measures deliver an idea about the state of financial development and are widely used in the literature. The financial development data were collected from the Financial Structure Database (FSD, 2007) (Beck et al., 2000) . Beck et al. (2004) provide a compilation and a discussion of the data. The former two measures are from Heston et al. (2006) Djankov et al., 2003) . In Table B .1 in Appendix B, summary statistics and correlations between the different variables are presented. FORMALISM is negatively, and CONSTRAINTS positively correlated with GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio and credit and stock market development. Importantly, FORMALISM is hardly correlated with CONSTRAINTS, thus confirming that these two variables indeed measure different dimensions of institutions. The simultaneous equations model that will be estimated by the IH method consists of three equations including a variable for economic development (ECONDEV), and two variables for institutions, FORMALISM and CONSTRAINTS. The baseline model, without controlling for exogenous variables, looks as follows: 
The parameters of interest are 12  and 13  . In the subsequent models, several exogenous control variables will be included to test for the robustness of the results.
SPLITTING THE SAMPLE
An elementary step in applying the IH method is to find a split of the data such that differences between the variances of the structural residuals occur and cause the relative variances of the residuals to differ across the subsamples. Following Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) , the analysis considers two different splits. The first split is based on the geographical location of a country. All countries located on the Eurasian continent and in Oceania are in one subsample, all countries on the African or American continent in the other subsample (see Table C .1 in Appendix C). The idea behind this split is based on an argument brought forward by Diamond (1997) and is related to the literature focusing on the effect of the climatic environment on economic development (e.g., Gallup et al. (1999) amongst others). Diamond (1997) , exploring the determinants of the history of conquest in the world, suggests a correlation between geographic location and technology transfer. Geography plays an important role in the sense that it is much more difficult for technologies (especially seed varieties and other agricultural technologies) to migrate along a North-South than an East-West axis because of the more unequal climatic environment along the former dimension. Importantly, the spatial distribution of countries in the African/American subsample is more concentrated around the equator than that in the Eurasian/Oceania subsample. In terms of the level of economic development, countries located on the African and American continents are therefore expected to be poorer and more homogenous than countries belonging to the Eurasia/Oceania subsample. As shown above, not a difference in the variances is needed, but a change in the relative variances of the structural residuals. Thus, a discrepancy in the variances of at least one of the two other equations with the institutions variables on the left-hand is required. Table 1 anticipates the estimation results and presents summary statistics, in particular the variances, for the structural residuals. These results support the above mentioned reasoning. For the geography split (Panel A), the variance of the structural residual of the GDP per capita equation is more pronounced in the subsample containing countries located on the East-West axis than on the North-South axis. Importantly, the variances of the other equations with legal formalism and constraints on executive as dependent variables differ as well. In particular, the countries located on the Eurasian continent and Oceania are more homogenous with respect to institutional quality. In terms of property (3) A second criterion to split the data is whether a country was colonized by a foreign (European) power or not. The idea is that countries colonized by European colonizers have similar experiences making them different to other countries with respect to the variance of the structural residuals. However, Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2002) plausibly elaborate that the colonization history was not a homogenizing experience, as the colonization strategy employed was dependent on the disease environment and the population density in the colonies. In former European colonies with a substantially better disease environment and lower population density, the colonizers set up good institutions and settled down themselves. In contrast, if the disease environment was hostile and the country densely populated, the colonizers set up extractive institutions. Today, the successful countries (in terms of economic development) are the ones that had a better disease environment and a lower population density at the time of colonization, because they have benefited from the good institutions installed by the colonizing powers. Therefore, only former European colonies that cannot be assigned to the group of high income countries (according to the World Development Indicators (WDI) country classification in 2000) are considered in the sample of former colonies to increase the homogeneity (in terms of economic development) in this subsample (see C.2 in Appendix C).
7 Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the structural residuals when countries are classified according to their colonial experience, that is, whether they once were occupied by a colonial power or not. The variances of the structural residuals again support the above mentioned argument. The group of countries classified as former colonies is more homogenous (in terms of GDP per capita) than countries pooled in the other group. The summary statistics further indicate that the group of (ex-)colonies are more heterogenous in terms of the institutions variables. A difference in the relative variances across the subsamples is thus expected. Again, a formal test will follow in Section 5.
RESULTS
This section presents the main results, 8 concentrating on the relative effect of property rights and contracting institutions on economic development. To begin, estimates of the impact of legal formalism and constraints on executive on GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, credit provided to the private sector, and stock market capitalization by OLS are reported in Table 2 . Based on these results, both contracting and property rights institutions impact significantly on economic development. Only for stock market development, contracting institutions seem to be more important than property rights institutions. However, OLS estimates may be biased due to endogeneity of the regressors, in particular by a feedback effect running from economic development on both contracting and property rights institutions. Therefore, the analysis next concentrates on the coefficients estimated by the IH method that are robust to such feedback effects. The results obtained by estimating the baseline model (4) by the IH method using the geography split are reported in Table 3 for GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, credit provided to the private sector, and stock market capitalization. Table 4 shows the results for the baseline model using the colony split. The dependent variables are listed in the top row of each panel. The coefficients are arranged in columns. Results for testing properties (1) and (3) follow under the heading of Constants and Rank Condition, respectively.
Panel 1 of Tables 3 and 4 reports the coefficients for GDP per capita. 9 For both, the geography and the colony split, property rights institutions have a positive and significant effect on GDP per capita. However, there is no systematic (positive) relationship between contracting institutions and GDP per capita. The corresponding coefficient is negative in the geography split, pointing to a positive effect of contracting institutions. But the coefficient is not significant at an acceptable level. In the colony split, the coefficient is positive, but again not significant. For each split, the second panel of Tables 3 and 4 shows the results for investment. The investment to GDP ratio is positively and significantly affected by property rights institutions in the geography split. There is, however, no significant effect from property rights institutions on the investment to GDP ratio observable in the colony split. For both splits, better contracting institutions do not increase the investment share. Panel 3 of Tables 3 and 4 reports the results for credit market development. Countries with better property rights institutions also have more developed credit markets (in terms of credit provided to the private sector as a share of GDP). However, the respective coefficient is positive and significant only in the geography split, but not the colony split. There is again no systematic relationship between contracting institutions and credit provided to the private sector. In both splits, the coefficient is negative, but small and insignificant. The results for stock market development (in terms of stock market capitalization as a share of GDP) are reported in panel 4 of Tables 3 and 4. Both contracting and property rights institutions have a positive and significant effect on stock market capitalization in the case of the geography split. In the colony split however, both coefficients are imprecisely estimated and thus not significant.
To summarize, the coefficient estimates for the baseline model based on the geography split reveal that better property rights institutions impact positively on economic development, while contracting institutions have no effect on GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, and credit provided to the private sector. The coefficient on 9 Note that the results using the log of GDP per capita instead of GDP per capita are less persuasive.
Results using the log of GDP per capita are reported in Table E .1 in Appendix E. It is worth noting, however, that taking the log of GDP per capita reduces the heteroskedasticity in the data (with respect to the geography and the colony split), something that makes identification more difficult by the IH method. Remember that the identification method relies on the heteroskedasticity in the data. Therefore, in the main part, results for GDP per capita are reported.
contracting institutions is only significant in the case of stock market capitalization. The results based on the colony split are less conclusive. The effect of property rights institutions on economic development only persists in one case, namely GDP per capita. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, t-statistic for equality of constants in double parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance of the parameter estimates on the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, t-statistic for equality of constants in double parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance of the parameter estimates on the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level.
For the sake of robustness, a number of control variables are included to account for other determinants of economic development. Again, this part starts with the presentation of the OLS results, shown in Table 2 . Controlling for geographic location and religious affiliation does not affect the general picture obtained by the baseline models: Both contracting and property rights institutions impact significantly on economic development. Only for stock market development, contracting institutions seem to matter more than property rights institutions. As before, these results may well be corrupted by feedback effects from economic development on institutions.
To get a more reliable picture, the following conclusions will be drawn from coefficients estimated by the IH method. Table 5 reports the effects of contracting and property rights institutions on GDP per capita (left side) and on the investment to GDP ratio (right side), controlling for latitude and religious affiliation. 10 The results are robust to these extensions. In both the geography and the colony split, property rights institutions but not contracting institutions have a significantly positive effect on GDP per capita and the investment share. The coefficient on executive constraints fails to be significant only when latitude is included in the equation with the investment share applying the colony split. Table 6 reports the results for credit and stock market development, again controlling for latitude and religious affiliation. Focusing on credit market development, property rights institutions seem to be relatively more important than contracting institutions. Only in the case of the model extension with religious affiliation using the colony split, the coefficient on constraints on executive fails to be significant. Contracting institutions never have a significant impact on credit market development in both splits. Compared to the baseline model, the biggest differences are observed when controlling for geographic location and religious affiliation in the case of stock market development. Contracting institutions never have a significant effect, and also property rights institutions do not seem to matter for stock market development.
Only in the model extension with religious affiliation and applying the geography split, the coefficient on constraints on executive is significant. Concerning property (3), that indicates the quality of model identification, it becomes evident that the overall performance of the IH method in the baseline model is good in the case of GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio and credit market development using the geography as well as the colony split. The geography split is somewhat better, as for the investment to GDP ratio and credit market development the rank condition is satisfied in all three cases, but only in two of three cases for the colony split. Extending the model with latitude reduces the quality of identification, but is still acceptable. However, the identification is generally less conclusive when extending the models with religious affiliation. For stock market development, identification is only acceptable for the geography split in the baseline model.
There is, though, a further caveat of the colony split. The original colony split (described in Section 4 and used above) proposes that the homogenizing experience was bad European colonization. Therefore, the five countries in the sample that have been colonized by European powers, but can be assigned to the group of high income countries today (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States) are not classified as former colonies. However, if the sample would be split along the argument that European colonization per se is crucial, these five countries have to be classified as former European colonies. The results thereon are presented in Tables F.1. and F.2 in Appendix F. The main differences to the original colony split concern GDP per capita and credit market development. Property rights institutions seem to be no longer important for GDP per capita. For credit market development, contracting institutions have a significant effect in the baseline model and the model extension with latitude. However, in the model extension with religious affiliation again property rights institutions are relevant, identical to the result from the original colony split. Hence, the results from this alternative colony split do only confirm partially the findings of the original colony split. However, the results applying the alternative colony split still differ completely from the OLS estimation. Nevertheless, in our view, the argument that it has to be considered that the colonization strategy employed by the colonizers may have differed from one place to the other is more convincing.
Thus, comparing coefficients from the OLS regressions and the IH method, it becomes evident that ignoring feedback effects from economic development on institutions appear to bias estimates. This is particularly apparent for the effect of contracting institutions on economic development. The results from the IH estimates indicate that differences in economic development can hardly be explained by differences in contracting institutions. However, there is evidence that better property rights institutions are positive for economic development. Overall, it seems that property rights institutions are relatively more important than contracting institutions for economic development. This result is in line with previous findings by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) . Their sample is, however, restricted to about 60 former colonies due to the specific instrumental variables they apply (settler morality and population density in 1500). One exception is the impact of institutions on financial development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that, in addition to property rights institutions, contracting institutions matter for stock market development, an effect not present for credit market development. They thus conclude that contracting institutions matter for the form of financial development. Based on the results presented here, there is no support for this conclusion. It has to be admitted, however, that the identification in this case is unsatisfactory.
Looking at the reverse effect, running from economic development on institutions, 11 the results from the IH estimates indicate that differences in property rights institutions can hardly be explained by differences in GDP per capita, the investment to GDP ratio, credit provided to the private sector, and stock market capitalization. However, there is evidence that a higher level of economic development entails better contracting institutions. This result is robust to the inclusion of geographic location and religious affiliation. (4)).
CONCLUSION
In this paper a simultaneous equations model is identified using the heteroskedasticity in the data to analyze the relative effect of property rights and contracting institutions on economic development. The results suggest that property rights institutions are relatively more important than contracting institutions for GDP per capita, the investment share and credit market development. However, neither contracting nor property rights institutions seem to have an impact on stock market development. Regarding the reverse effect running from economic development to institutions, an impact from economic development on contracting but not property rights institutions is detected. Apparently, property rights institutions do not improve as the level of economic development increases. Other forces have to be identified, such as sizeable income inequalities for example, that may explain changes in property rights institutions. However, the results indicate that at lower levels of economic development, contracting institutions are substantially inferior. Thus, the results suggest that better property rights institutions have a potential to advance economic development. This in turn may create an appropriate environment for better contracting institutions. C. Countries 
D. Rank Condition
The rank condition in the case of a simultaneous equations system with two endogenous variables is (see Rigobon, 2003) Table E .1 indicates, using log GDP per capita instead of GDP per capita, the model identification (Rank Cond.) is less persuasive than the model identification in the baseline model (see Tables 3 and 4) . Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, t-statistic for equality of constants in double parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance of the parameter estimates on the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate, respectively, significance of the parameter estimates on the 10%, 5%, and the 1% level.
